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ABSTRACT

THE POLmcs OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: NATURAL FOREST POLICY

IN CHILE, VENEZUELA, COSTA RICA,~ MEXICO

-

I
This paper argues that. two opposing views of sustainJle development--market-friendly

and grassroots development--lie at the heart of political dispules over this issue. Because it has

been a Jightrung rod for conflict over the use of natural ren~able resouices, forest policy. offers
an excellent window into the comparative politics of sustaina~le develpment. Explaining whether
'

'

i

a country has exclusively market-oriented forest_ policy or whether it also includes significant
elements of the· grassroots approach requires an examination )of when and how four broad
factors affect outcomes: ideas, state institutions, social groupsl and international conditions.
Paired comparisons show that cohesive teams of experts in leld ministries may define the

I

executive's approach, but whether they succeed or fail depen1s on other factors; specifically, the
capacity of social groups to forge larger socio~political alliancb, and the presence or absence of
direct external-intervention in the policy process.

THE POLITICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: NATURAL FOREST POLICY
IN· CHILE, VENEZUELA, COSTA RICA, AND MEXICO

The concept of sustainable development, which seeks to bridge incompatibilities between
environmental integrity and economic development, has become a topic of growing concern in
North-South relations. Yet the issue has also erupted onto the national policy agendas of many
developing countries. Consequently, it poses interesting questions for comparative politics as well
as for international relations and development studies. Natural forest policy in particular offers a
useful window into the comparative politics of sustainable development because it has been a
lighting rod for political conflict over the use of natural renewable resources. Yet most of the
burgeoning literature on sustainable development and forests has avoided the problem of politics. 1
Studies generally focus on the diagnosis of factors responsible for unsustainable development and
policy prescriptions to halt the destruction. However, beyond an invocation of the need for political
will analysts usually do not address the conditions that induce governments to adopt the policies
they prescribe.2
To get to the heart of the politics of sustainable development, this paper argues that there are
two ideal typical views of that concept; each with its own assumpt10ns, diagnoses, and policy
' prescriptions. One of them emphasizes market solutions and large-scale industry while the other
favors policies that are inore grassroots development oriented and participatory. The natural forest
policies of Chile, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Mexico tend to cluster on the marketfrtendly/grassroots axis. Without excluding industrial interests, Costa Rica and Venezuela have
included significant elements of the grassroots development approach to the sustainable development
of natural forests. By contrast, Chile and Mexico only emphasize the market-friendly alternative.

1
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In addition to these differences, politicization of natural forest policy was high in Chile and Costa
Rica, low in Mexico and Venezuela.
These outcomes and the general lack of political analyses in the existing literature raise two
basic questions. What factors influenced a government's basic orientation with respect to the
sustainable development of their natural forests? When can we expect policy formulation in this
issue area to be highly politicized? To answer these questions the paper examines when and how
ideas, state institutions, social groups, and international factors affected those results. The
comparison of the four cases shows that ideas--in the form of cohesive networks of experts--and
state institutions must be· complemented with factors drawn from a political economy framework.
Ideologues and state institutions may define the initial impetus of policy, but their relationship to
social groups and external actors must also be considered.
The paper develops this argument over four sections. ·The first section examines the policy
irnplications of contending interpretations of sustainable development. The next part briefly outlines
a framework for understanding the differences among the cases with respect to policy orientation
and the degree of conflict over natural forest policy. The third section applies the interpretative
framework to the country cases. Having presented some data, the conclusion returns "to the
relationship between ideas, state institutions, social groups, and international factors in explaining
the outcomes among the cases.

COMPETING CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF SUSTAINABL~ DEVELOPMENT

The literature on environment and development posits a strong relationship between
economic development, poverty, and. environmental ,quality. Bad economic performance increases
poverty which accelerates environmental degradation. 3 Given these findings, the Brundtland
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Commission first popularized the concept of sustainable development in 1987.4 It called for a
development model capable of meeting the basic needs of a developing country's population without
depleting the stock of natural resources in ways that rob future generations of their use. For policy
purposes development economists concurred that sustainable development consists of three main
building blocks: a healthy economy, attention to social equity, and environmental quality. 5 And
here agreement largely ends, for differing views exist on how to define the properties of these
components and the relationship between them.
For analytical purposes, this paper argues that two alternative conceptualizations of
sustainable development lie at the heart of political conflict over environment and development and
natural forest policy in developing countries. Each has its own diagnosis and policy prescriptions.
They also loosely fit in the right to.left political spectrum. 6
The dominant approach among top decision makers in Latin America, the United States, and
in multilateral lending organizations, such as the World Bank, is a market-friendly one. 7 Healthy
economic growth lies at the heart of this approach. To. achieve rapid economic growth, developing
countries must engage in free-market economic restructuring. That means, building market
economies with minimum state intervention, integrating them into world markets, reinforcing private
property rights over cooperative efforts, and increasing foreign direct investment. ~he negative
environmental ·impacts of vigorous economic expansion are considered to be unfortunate side
effects. The best way to address the problem is to add technologies that moderate the
environmental impact of existing industrial processes (end-of-pipe technologies), rather than finding
substitutes or alternative methods. 8
This perspective largely reduces ·the problem of social ·equity and environmental integrity to
free-market based economic growth. Rapid economic expansion should improve national per capita
income, and therefore standards of living. Targeted welfare programs for the extremely poor,
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supported by World Bank structural adjustment loans, provide minimum safety nets ir.r those
temporarily left out of the market. As expanding economies draw people into national markets such
pio~s can be· scaled back The rise in standards .of living alone 'will have a benefial effect on
the environment. From the market-fnendly perspective wealthier people have the leisure to be
concerned about environmental quality. Desperately poor people simply degrade it ls long as
open political systems prevail, an ~conomically better off and envir~nmentally awarejpopulation will
organize special interest groups to pressure government into action, and to help impl ment its
policies--a. thoroughly pluralist conception of politics. In addition to these assumptiot, the
approach also tends to privilege global environmental problems: global wanning, ozo~e depletion,
acid rain, management of the ocean, and urban questions such as waste management.
Translated to the forest, the market-friendly view of sustainable development offers the
following policy prescriptions. The survival of natural forests depends on giving it Tononiic value.
It values trees (not forests) for their contributions to solving global environmental problems such as

the reduction of gases that .contribute to global warming, fixing soil to keep it from Jading,
protecting watersheds. Given this perspective, the market friendly approach privilegls the
I

development of large-scale plantation industry. It contributes to global environmental goals,
increases social equity by offering employment, and earns foreign exc~ange. Plantat1ons also
promot~ and deepen market relations in rural areas and undercut cooperative efforts based on an
outdared romanticism. This means that projects for poor communities that do not intolve largescale plantations should mainly focus on the incorporation of individual small-scale farmers or
peasants into markets. In short, the market-friendly approach endorses p~ivate propel

rights over

cooperative ventures and communal ownership. It also recommends· the elimination of government
subsidies that make deforestation profitable, reducing the role of the state to minimi e the impact of
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bureaucratic incompetence, and then strengthening institutional capacities in sharply reduced spheres
of state action. 10
The grassroots development alternative to the market-friendly view differs on virtually every
dimension. It strives to take each of the terms of sustainable development--economic growth, social
equity, and environment--into account in their own right, and then seeks linkages between them.
Healthy economic growth is certainly necessary, but it alone will not drive everything else. This
_view also questions whether free market oriented economic restructuring is the best path. The focus
on end-of-pipe technology offers few incentives to tackle the roots of the environmental dilemma:
existing industrial processes. Moreover, the history of capitalist development on the periphery
suggests that market-based growth by itself will not reduce basic social inequalities or promote rapid
economic growth. 11
The grassroots development approach draws many of its values from the ecological
movement. Accepting that socio-economic systems will remain basically market-oriented, it stresses
more appropriate, smaller scale, decentralized economic activity based on cleaner production
processes and products to substitute for highly toxic ones. The state has an important role in the
promotion of such change via regulation and incentives. -organized social groups should have
ample participation in policy making processes and policy implementation, including decisions about
technological packages.
Taking the concern for citizen participation a step further, this perspective links the
improvement of social eq~ity to the social, economic, and cultural self-determination of subordinate
class and ethnic-based groups. Policy prescriptions emphasize grassroots development projects that
promote local self reliance and control over resources "in order achieve a more equitable distribution
of wealth. In rural areas, there is an added emphasis on technologies that mimic natural processes.
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In urban areas, the approach encourages self-help groups for environmental health, clean-up, and
improvement (green belts). 12
The grassroots development approach to sustainable development is more holistic than the
market-friendly one. According to this view, the ecological impact of human activities cuts across
economic, as well as social, economic, and political boundaries. Consequently, sector-specific
environmental policy must take into account how policies in other sectors affect the proposed
project. This requires coordinated action among state agencies and the organizations of civil
society.
When it come~ to natural forests, the grassroots development view emphasizes the basic
needs of impoverished rural populations--peasants and small-scale farmers. Their livelihoods will
improve to the degree to which organized communities build small scale cooperative enterprises to
manage forest harvests, ,industrialize the timber, and link up with local, regional, national, and world
markets. The approach favors projects that cultivate the multiple use of the forest, both for timber
and nontimber products including social forestry and reforestation practices, extraction of nontimber
products, and the combination of forestry with agriculture (agroforestry) or ranching. These
measures provide peasants with a basket of economically important goods while conserving natural
forests. In short, the focus· is on organized communities as a vehicle for the selfdetermination of
subordinate social groups as opposed to the extension of market relations at the community level.
Although the argument presents market-friendly and grassroots development
conc·eptualizations of sustainable development as opposites, in reality they are not mutually
exclusive. There can be many combinations of the two. Yet the distinction performs a useful
analytical function. ·It nicely reveals the core of the political conflict over the issue of sustainable
development. Since Latin American economies are essentially .market-based, grassroots
development policies cannot totally supplant the market-friendly view. This means that the policy
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struggle turns more on the issue of consistently including significant elements of grassroots
development.,oriented concerns in an overall policy package along with improvement of sustainable
industrial harvesting of natural forests. In short, it is more a question of balance than an either-or
proposition. ,

EXPLAINING THE POLITICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The recent forest policy of Chile, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Mexico allow for paired
comparisons along two dimensions with respect to outcomes. The first dimension focuses on
whether forest policy drew exclusively from the market-friendly approach, or whether it 8:lso
incorporated significant elements of the grassroots development approach. · Tue second dimension
considers the degree of politicization over the issue. The matrix exhibited below shows how the
cases fit along those dimensions. Costa Rica and Venezuela incorporated grassroots development
concerns while those of Chile and Mexico did not. Politicization of the native forest policy was
high in Chile and Costa Rica, low in Mexico and Venezuela.

Sustainable Development
Market-Friendly
Grassroots Development

High

Chile

Costa Rica

Low

Mexico

Venezuela

Conflict

What, then, accounts for the similarities and differences in the environmentally conscious
forest policy of these cases and their degree of politicization? This paper examines when and how
four broad factors influence the differences among the cases: ideas, polltical institutions, social
groups, and external conditions. This methodology builds on recent work about political and
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economic change that has called attention to the relative futility of seeking to determine which one
of these factors has more overall explanatory power. 13 In short, instead of offering a general
causal model, this paper establishes which of those factors carry more weight than the others under
carefully specified circumstances; This allows for the construction of predictive propositions with
rigorous attention to context. 14 Within similar contexts the same combination of variables should
produce similar results. The value of the four cases is that they cover a range of differences in
country characteristics that typify most situations in Latin, America.
This approach seeks to build on the shortcomings of two separate strands of theorizing in the
emerging literature over the determinants of environmental politics, where each sought to explain
outcomes based on only a pair of the four conditions. One explanation focused on the role of ideas
and the institutional capacity of the state. In this view, networks of experts in government agencies
bound together by shared values, knowledge, and policy recommendations shape the .state's response
to environmental problems. Differences in policy cohesiveness and extensiveness depend on the
relative autonomy of the institution that developed the policy. 15
This approach suffers on at least two accounts. First, it shares the weaknesses of statist
approaches in general. It only looks at the relationship of specific ,interest groups to the state and
ignores the effect of broader social coalitions that may support ,or oppose proposed policy.
Secondly, this approach has not taken into account the politicization of environmental issues. There
is no one technocratic solution to a problem, which leaves the door open for, alliance building
between conflicting groups, including socia~ groups and external actors. Moreover, these groups and
actors may seek allies within state institutions that do not support the objectives of the ministry in
charge of forest policy.
A second approach examined the role that social groups and international factors played in
forcing recalcitrant governments to adopt policies that promote the sustainable development of
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native forests. These studies mostly focused on the struggle to establish extractive reserves in
Brazil. The main problem with this approach was that the state remained a black box.· Because
they concentrated on the sources of resistance to destructive policies and the imposition of more
benevolent policy upon the state, these studies said little if anything about the role of state actors in
the design of environmentally conscious native forest policy. 16
Given the shortcomings of these alternative explanations, which show that each of those
factors is a necessary but not sufficient condition, it seems appropriate to consider when and how all
four conditions affect both the policies designed to achieve the sustainable development of natural
forests in Latin America and the degree of conflict over the issue. An examination of the role
played by ideas in the form of policy making teams within the relevant sectoral ministry is a good
place to start. Beginning with "statist" factors makes sense because Latin American political
systems are usually dominated by the executive branch. Thus, one might expect that the ideas of
the policy making teams charged with initiating the policy formulation stage of the policy process
within the lead ministry will heavily influence the framing of the policy debate.
But this is not a sufficient condition. In all of the cases cohesive policy making teams with
solid state institutional backing initiated forest policy reforms. Yet final outcomes often differed
from initial efforts due to conflicts that appeared at different stages of the policy process. Because
neoliberal economic restructuring dominates the political agenda in Latin America, as a general rule
conflict erupted when the policy making team in the lead ministry sought to incorporate elements of
the grassroots development approach. Yet exceptions and other twists pose an interesting challenge
for explanation. For example, proponents of the grassroots .development approach dominated forest
policy making within the state in-three of the four cases: Chile, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. As
expected, forest policy was highly politicized in the first two, but, contrary to expectation, not in
Venezuela. Moreover, conflict over grassroots development oriented policy did not always result in
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complete defeat for its advocates. In Chile they lost, in Costa Rica they struck a compromise, and
in Venezuela they largely had a-free hand. By the same token, Mexico changed from a grassroots
oriented forest policy in the 1970s and 1980s to a market-friendly line in the 1990s with little
conflict.
Understanding these outcomes requires an examination of social forces that opposed or
supported the lead ministry's policy making team, their power resources, and the presence or
absence of strong, direct international influences. When external factors are only background
conditions, social groups, their coalitions, and their relative capabilities will be the deciding
factor. 17 Chile suggests that efforts to incorporate grassroots development ideas in natural forest
policy are likely to be highly politicized and fail in cases where private timber interests are
powerful, -own the forests that provide their timber, and generate substantial economic benefits for
the 11ations' accounts. Their economic power allows them to forge _alliances with broader sociopolitical forces, such as_ political parties and the rest of the business community. Their combined
weight can overwhelm the efforts of environmentalists no matter how strong the backing from the
executive branch. By contrast, Venezuela shows that if private timber groups do not contribute
much. to the economy and if they hold the forests in concessions from the state, grassroots
development efforts may have a greater chance to succeed. That is because the timber interests will
probably not be able to forge larger defensive coalitions.
The influence of international factors varies with the strength of the ties to the regional
hegemon-~in this case the United States. Where the regional hegemon has a strong presence it can
tip the balance of internal power in favor of the domestic groups it supports. 18 The United States '
essentially supports the-market-oriented approach to sustainable development and it habitually seeks
to strengthen the private sector. Thus, Costa Rica suggests that in cases where the United States has
a strong presence, where forest policy seeks to incorporate grassroots development ideals, and where

the private thnber interests are weak, U.S. intervention in the policy debate may extract significant
concessions from the proponents of a grassroots development approach, or defeat them entirely.
Free-trade treaties are also an international factor. Mexico shows that treaty conditionality enhances
the capabilities of market-friendly socio-political groups. 19 They compel legislative changes that
favor market forces.

THE CASES: CHILE, VENEZUELA, COSTA RICA, AND MEXICO

The cases al'e presented as paired comparisons with respect to. both outcomes and
explanatory factors. In the first pair, Chile retained a market-oriented policy after fierce struggle,
while Venezuela incorporated some grassroots elements. Differences in domestic conditions~-the
economic power of timber interests--largely determined these outcomes. In the second pair, Costa
Rica and Mexico, again, one included grassroots policies--although much attenuated from the
original position, while the other adopted a market-oriented approach. External conditions blunted
the grassroots components of policy in Costa Rica and facilitated the triumph of market-friendly
forest policy in Mexico.

Chile: The Persistence Of Market-Oriented Natural Forest 'Policy

Chile's current forest policy has a strong market-orientation and suffered high levels of
politicization with the return to democracy in 1990. The military government (1973-1989) d·eepened
the market-oriented aspects of forest policy begun in the '1960s. Since 1974, Decree Law 701 and
its modifications have provided abundant financial incentives for the development of a timber
industry ba~ed on plantations of exotic species (not native to the country), basically radiata pine and
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some eucalyptus. The incentive system's structure, however, only made it accessible to large-scale
national and international timber companies, where the national firms were part of Chile's most
important conglomerates. By the late 1980s, the timb~r industry contributed close to a billion
dollars in foreign exchange earnings. 20 In Southern Chile, widespread substitution of natural
forests for plantations, and to turn short fiber natural species into wood chips for export, were the
principal ecological problems of this incentive system. A lack of sustained economic returns from
the natural forest for small and medium scale land owners--many of them peasants--was the main
socio-economic drawback. 21
With the arrival. of democracy in 1990 environmental issues burst on the policy agenda. A
legislative bill to sustainably develop natural forests was high on the list of priorities in this issue
area, along with the formulation of a general environmental law. The bill that the administration of
Patricio Aylwin sent to the legislature incorporated some important, albeit mild, elements of the
grassroots approach to sustainable development. First, it sought to establish a fiscal incentive
program to cover most of the costs of natural forest management modeled on that provided for
plantations. Yet, the incentives were to be highly accessible to small and medium land owners, the
category which had possession of much of the remaining natural forests not owned by corporations.
It is worth pointing out that in Chile, as well as throughout Latin America, this social group is
among the most impoverished rural sectors, for forests tend to stand on the most marginal lands.
The second grassroots development-oriented feature of the bill defended natural forests against clear
cutting by industrial interests. It carefully defined the extent to and place where companies could do
so. This bill generated turbulent political conflict and never became the law of the land, despite the
best efforts of the Aylwin administration over four years. As a result, the market-oriented policy of
the military dictatorship still prevails. 22
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How to account for this outcome? In keeping with our interpretative framework, the
ideological background of the policy making team, and strong backing by the lead government
agency--the Ministry of Agriculture--offer the best starting point. The core of the policy making
team had long advocated the sustainable development of natural forests from a grassroots
development point of view. During the transition to democracy, they formed part of the technical
team that put together the opposition to the dictatorship's campaign program for environmental
problems. 23 With the victory of the center-left opposition coalition (Concertacion de Partidos par
la Democracia, or simply Concertaci6n) they obtained important positions for forest policy making
under the wing of the Ministry of Agriculture. From the beginning, their policy proposals· suffered
from sharp attacks by timber interests that attempted to gut the relatively soft grassroots-oriented
approach of the core policy making team. Those efforts included splitting the policy making team
itself and turning more powerful ministries against agriculture. 24 Unwavering support from. the
Minister of Agriculture, and ultimately the favorable intervention of the president of the republic
himself, assured that the central points of the proposed bill made it into the version that the
executive sent to the congress. 25 Yet they failed to pass the bill. Their defeat despite the presence
of strong "statist" variables underscores the necessity of combining this approach with factors drawn
from a political economy perspective.
Because international factors were essentially background conditions, domestic factors
proved much more significant in the explanation of the failure to reform forest policy in Chile. The
most important of those domestic factors were class-based social groups and their economic and
institutional power resources. Given Chile's economic and political history, the aforementioned
large-scale industrialists in timber were very powerful. The free'-market economic model of the
military government had privileged agro-extractive exports .. As seen above, timber had become one
of Chile's leading exports and the companies themselves were part of the nation's largest multi-
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sectoral conglomerates. Their economic power secured them the support of other business sectors,
as represented by the industrialists' peak association. 26
The central role of timber in Chile's economic model, and solid general private sector
support, rallied conservative political parties in Congress to the defense of the timber interests;
Conservatives argued that they were preserving Chile's successful economic model against the
corrosive attacks C!f leftists, now disguised as environmentalists. Had timber industrialists not
played such a key role in the symbolism of free-market economics in Chile, it is unlikely that the
conservative political parties would hav~ protected them.
Conservative political parties played this key role as a result of the structure of the
relationship between the executive and the legislative branches of government. The military
government wanted an institutional arrangement that would protect its free-market economic model
from the kinds of efforts that the natural forest policy bill represented. To that end, through ,
gerrymandering and other means, the dictatorship arranged the over representation of conservative
parties in the Congress. Moreover, they had an assured majority in the Senate which had veto
power over all legislation. 27 The ministry of Agriculture's natural forest policy bill passed the
House of Deputies, but has been terminally blocked in the Senate.

Venezuela: Forests Come Of Age

Venezuela has haq an active concern for environmental issues since the mid-1970s with the
creation of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Renewable Resources (MARNR). However, it
only began to seriously address forestry issues as of the ·late ·1980s. 28 Its policies attempted to
balance industrial management oflhe natural forest with conservation and some peasant and native
American grassroots development in forestry. The forests are public lands, and the forest service
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extends concessions to timber interests. The forest service, first created as a government agency in
its own right (Direcci 6n General) in 1990, significantly increased regulation and oversight of
sustainable harvest methods for timber. The forests in Eastern Venezuela have very little population
and are essentially given over to sustainable industrial harvesting of the natural forest. In the more
populated areas of Western Venezuela, the forest .service began an extensive program in community
agroforestry to reduce encroachment on the natural forest reserves in concession to industry. 29 In
the new state of Amazonas, SADA-Amazonas (the oversight agency for that region) began a
program to organize native American communities for the extraction and commercialization of nontimber forest products. A branch of the German development agency strongly supported this
project. 30
Like in Chile, the grassroots development features of natural forest policy were relatively
modest policies that antagonized timber industry interests. How was it that Venezuelan policy
makers managed to carry out these policies while Chileans could not? Why was there no great
political conflict over these measures, as had been the case in Chile? Differences in the economic
orientation of their administrations cannot explain the divergence of outcomes. The Venezuelan
presidency's main policy goals also centered on neoliberal economic restructuring. 31
In Venezuela, external conditions were mainly background factors. This meant that, like
Chile, differences in domestic conditions largely accounted for the variance. Also similar to Chile,
the incorporation of mild grassroots development objectives in Venezuela's natural forest policy
originated with a relatively cohesive group of experts that had the full backing of the lead ministry-the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources. The cohesiveness of their policy positions was
rooted in the functional division and coordination of that ministry. Moreover, again as in Chile,. the
president of the republic had placed environmental issues on the administration's policy agenda. 32
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The key difference lay in the capacity of industrial groups to oppose the grassroots
development aspects of natural forest policy. Venezuelan- timber industrialists unsuccessfully
lobbied the forest service, and then proved unable to mount larger political campaigns to pressure
the forest service. This outcome, in contrast to Chile, was rooted in the highly dissimilar political
economy of Venezuela. Venezuela has an oil economy and the timber industry is economically
insignificant; its weakness exacerbated by the fact that the firms do not own the lands they exploit.
The state gives them in concession. Nor are the companies part of the largest Venezuelan consortia.
As a result, the timber industry cannot command allies among other business groups or within other
ministries to force the forest service to soften or change its policies. 33 In neither sectors would
they find persons willing to expend-political capital for such relatively insignificant business
interests.
The low status of the ministry of environment in the cabinet hierarchy underscores the
analytical significance of the weakness of timber industrialists and the consequences of their
incapacity to form alliances. In Venezuela, higher up line ministries (such as economy, finance,
development, mines and energy) and parapublic enterprises ca~ stymie the environmental ministry's
policies with relative ease. 34 This occurs with some frequency.
Costa Rica: The Search For Balance

Costa Rica has had a' greater commitment to the incorporation of policies and projects that
reflected the grassroots development approach to the sustainable development -of natural forests than
either Chile or Venezuela. 35 Since 1986, the forest service has had a specific departm'ent devoted
to such efforts. 36 That department, and the forest service in general, has come under increasing
attack since 1990 during the drawn out, highly politicized struggle over the formulation and passage
of a new forestry law. Sharp conflict over the bill has delayed its passage in Congress for four
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years, where it still languishes. In the final analysis, the grassroots development supporters suffered
set backs, but were not entirely defeated as in Chile.
The explanatory challenge lies in the fact that, only to a slightly lesser degree than in the
previous two cases, the team in charge of policy making and its institutional backing within the state
essentially favored the grassroots development oriented socio-political forces. But timber interests
were weak as they had been in Venezuela. How, then, could the market-friendly forces mount such
a significant challenge? The crucial difference rested in the presence of a strong international
factor--the United States government, which has traditionally exercised its prerogatives in Central
America.
In Costa Rica, both the Ministry of Natural Renewable Resources Energy and Mines and the
legislative Assembly's Agricultural Commission shared policy formulation responsibilities in the
forest issue area. 37 In the main, from mid 1990 to mid 1992, a cohesive group of experts in the
forest service and the technical team of advisors to the legislative commission drafted a forest bill
with a whole section devoted to grassroots development. 38 It legislated fiscal incentives for small
holders to sustainably extract timber from natural forests (what the Chileans wanted to do) and for
reforestation with native species. Some incentives, financed by donations from Holland, already
existed by decree. The novelty was that the bill established the Costa Rican state's responsibility in
this area. The bill also had clauses ,that strengthened peasant organizations so that cooperative
efforts in community forestry and reforestation might be more successful. To ensure access to
markets, it mandated the integration of their timber in industrial production. It essentially provided
no incentives for plantations with exotic species or for large-scale industrial timber enterprises to
exploit natural forests. It also heavily regulated the exploitation and transport of timber. 39
Timber interests and their political and intellectual allies were outraged at this bill. What
could they do to stop it? As in Venezuela, the timber interests were economically weak. By and
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large, the industrialists did not own the forests. They were almost entirely in the hands of smallholders and peasants. Consequently, timber industrialists found it difficult to enlist help from other
business sectors to lobby higher instances of government. 40
The Costa Rican proponents of a market-oriented approach to sustainable development found
two supports. First, within the executive branch the grassroots development oriented forces were
not quite as strong as they had been in Chile and Venezuela. This aided the timber interests, but as
will be seen, not decisively. More progressive versions of natural forestry legislation began· their
life under the more social democratic Partido Liberal administration of Oscar Arias (1986-1990). 41
Shortly after the following more conservative administration of the opposition party (1990-1994)
to.ok over the presidency a constitutional challenge to the law opened it up for debate once again. 42
The new administration replaced ministers and top political appointees in the· environmental
agencies, -but the main technical teams remained due to civil service clauses and political
maneuvering. To make a long story short, the team of experts and the role of the Legislative
Assembly in the policy making process led to the bill discussed above that the new minister could
not override even though he opposed it. 43 Thus, although in formal terms the cohesiveness of
executive backing for the grassroots effort was not as stn;mg as in Chile and Venezuela, it was not
the deciding factor in the outcome.
An external factor, the direct intervention of the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) made the crucial difference in Costa Rica. The head of the rural
d~velopment department strongly advocated iarket-oriented policies, and was an admirer of the
Chilean timber industry. Thus, the minister o{ natural resources and the private sector turned to him
for help against the grassroots-oriented policy !making team in the ministry and the legislature.
!

f

USAID provided the resources and organizatiqnal know-how to, first, contract a market-oriented

l

environmental think tank to develop a counter bill, and second, to improve private sector
i
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organization by pulling together the different sub-sector groups under the umbrella of a single
organization--the Camara Costaricense Forestal--to lobby bureaucrats and the Assembly. 44 The
strategy worked. In highly politicized, but not public, political maneuvering they blocked the
original bill, which was quite advanced in the legislative process. According to private sector
representatives, without help from USAID it was unlikely that weak timber industrialists and
relatively weak pro-market government actors would have had the. power to resist a more grassrootsoriented bill. 45
In the ensuing compromise (as of November 1994) the new bill presented much stronger
market-oriented elements than the original one. Nevertheless, grassroots-oriented forest
development still retains a place, which is different from both Chile and; as will be seen, Mexico. 46
In the face of entrenched political groups that favored grassroots development in the state, the
economic and political weakness of timber industrialists forced them to ally with small and medium
scale farmers. Both had an interest in the liberalization of state controls over logging. 47 As a
condition of their participation, the small and medium land owners and peasants negotiated
favorable clauses for their development with both large-scale timber interests and their allies within
the forest service. 48 In short, U.S. intervention on behalf of market-friendly forces significantly
bolstered them, but those forces were still not powerful enough for complete victory.

Mexico: Forests, Peasants, and the Reimposition of the Market

During the administration of Carlos Salinas (1988-1994), Mexico's forest policy shifted from
one that emphasized both industrial use and grassroots efforts to a policy that privileged a market-
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friendly perspective. 49 From the 1970s to the middle of the 1980s, forest policy encouraged largescale industrial use based on sustainable harvests from natural forests. It also promoted community
forestry by aiding organized peasant communities to manage, market, and industrialize their own
timber from sustainably managed forests. Beginning in 1986, but especially after 1990, natural
forest policy took on an exclusively market-oriented cast, modeled on the development of Chileanstyle. large-scale industrial plantations. 50 What influenced this shift and the relative lack of
politicization over the issue in the 1990s?
Like Costa Rica, the Mexican case shows how and when international variables may play
important roles in the politics of sustainable development. However, instead of direct intervention;
as in Costa Rica, Mexico highlights the significance of the presence or absence of trade treaties.
Before Mexico entered the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the balance of domestic factors largely determined
natural forest policy. Beginning in the 1970s, a cohesive group of experts who favored grassroots
development dominated policy making within the forest service of the Agriculture Secretariat. 51
Given Mexico's semi-authoritarian political system, their agency had substantial--but not total-autonomy from societal forces. 52 Because they favored grassroots development, they faced
resistance from regional alliances of timber interests, state governors, and foresters. Where ever that
alliance was strained, grassroots organizing among forestry ejidos--communal land grants for
peasants--became possible. Those tensions allowed the cohesive team of experts in the forest
agency of the Agriculture Secretariat to forge counter alliances with peasant communities, a few
state governors, and international cooperation from Europe. 53 Most of the existing examples of
social forestry in Mexico date 'back to this experience. 54 -The effort crystallized in the forestry law
of 1986.
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Mexico's entry into GATT in 1986 weakened this cohesive group of experts. This was
reflected in the regulations of the 1986 forest law, which gutted some the articles that sanctioned
grassroots development. 55 With negotiations for NAFTA UIJ.derway after 1990, the Salinas
administration appointed a new, cohesive group of market-oriented experts that swept the more
grassroots-oriented policy makers aside. 56 The presidency wanted them 'to rewrite forest law to fit
the conditions placed upon Mexico by the NAFTA treaty, and the general policy of free-market
economic restructuring under Salinas. 57 The market-friendly technical team wrote a new forestry
bill that privileged large-scale industrial. plantations over natural forest management. It also cut
organized peasants off from government aid--extension work, cr~dit, and protected markets. The
bill became law without great difficulty in 1992.
De~pite the market-orientation of new forest policy and its potential benefits for the private
sector, the weak, overprotected timber industry was ambivalent about the policy shift. Their
weakness stemmed from two sources. Technologically backward forestry firms did not contribute
much to the national economy and they did not own the forests. Peasant communities owned eighty
per cent of the forests. Thus, on the one hand, industrialists welcomed the opportunity to regain
control of timber resources. They felt it had been wrestled away from them by past legislation
which had favored peasant development. 58 On the other hand, they worried about the impact of
imports and the lack of an industrial policy to help them adjust to trade liberalization. They also
chafed under the Mexican government's focus on foreign direct investment. The few successful
peasant cooperatives felt the same way. Yet, despite, this common interest, the dispute" over control
of forest resources kept these two class-based social groups from allying. 59
The relative lack of importance of the forest sector in the economy largely explained the
weak politicization of the issue in Mexico. This meant that neither peasants with forests nor
overprotected and inefficient timber industrialists were very significant policy actors. Moreover,
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while lack of control over the forests hurt the timber interests, possession of the forest failed to
sfyengthen peasants because most lacked effective organization, capital, and know-how. 60 The
point is nicely contrasted by the fact that other more important and better developed peasant
agricultural sectors--basic grains and beans--received some relief in 1994. The forest sector did not.
As a result of these economic and organizational weakness, social actors linked to forestry lacked
allies in other ministries or among broader social groups to ameliorate their plight. This is
particularly important in Mexico, because, unlike Chile or Costa Rica, Mexico's state structure has
basically kept the legislature from being an arena for political struggle.
Some remnants of the grassroots development approach to sustainable development found a
niche iri a state institution that was lower in the cabinet hierarchy with respect to the formulation of
forest policy. They edged out strict preservationists in the National Ecology Institute (INE) of the
Solidarity Secretariat. 61 They mounted a critique of the Agriculture Secretariat's forest policy, a)ld
peasant groups that had begun community forestry projects in the last ten years sought them. out as a
source of support within the government. 62 But they were not very successful under the Salinas
administration, and the :issue never became highly politicized because INE had little jurisdiction over
national forest policy. ;J'hey were in charge of parks and nature reserves.

CONCLUSION

The cases demonstrated the utility of the distinction between market-friendly and grassrootsoriented forest policy as a tool to understand some of the fundamental political conflicts over
sustainable development. Policy. outcomes--legislative bills, decrees, and projects--reflected the
contending approaches. Politicization of the issue also followed those lines, The Chilean policy
process exhibited strong conflict, and market-friendly policies persisted in spite of the ideas of key
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policy makers who tried to introduce some different elements. Mexican policy makers introduced
legislation to copy the Chilean market friendly model in an_ effort to revert past po'licy that included
grassroots development, and without great upheaval. With high levels of conflict Costa Rican
policy still included some grassroots development ideas, while Venezuela managed to do the same
without much conflict.
The question then was, what determined the environmentally conscious natural forest policy
of the four cases, what made the policy debate particularly contentious in some but not in others?
An examination of the ideas of cohes_ive teams of experts within the state agency charged with

formulating forest policy proved to be a useful starting point. In all four cases, the initial impetus to
make natural forest policy compatible with the concept ofsustainable development originated with
them. All had solid state institutional backing. But this was clearly not a sufficient condition.
Whether they were able to translate their vision into policy depended on other factors. The cases
highlighted the utility of examining how two additional variables impinged upon the preferences of
policy makers. One focused on the impact of class and ethnic-based social groups and their sources
of economic and institutional power. The second factor took -into account the impact of
international factors, such as the nature of the regional hegemon, formal trade treaties, and direct
action in domestic politics.
The presence or absence of these factors helped to explain divergent outcomes. Chile and
Venezuela underscored the significance of domestic variables when external factors are only a
background variable. In both cases policy makers favored some weak grassroots measures. In,.
Venezuela they succeeded. In Chile they failed. This clearly had to do with the relative power of
the timber industry. In Chile, where timber contributes significantly to the economy, large-scale
timber industrialists--who own their forests--forged alliances with other ministries and business
sectors. Conservative political parties in congress also aided them. Having forged these alliances,
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business interests managed to stop the natural forestry bill. Venezuela has an oil economy. Timber
industrialists ate economically weak, hold the land in concession from the state, and are not
connected to other business groups. In this relative isolation they find themselves unable to change
policy.
Costa Rica and Mexico demonstrated the potential impact of international factors when they·
are more than background conditions. In Costa Rica, support from USAID allowed a weak timber
industry to challenge policy initiatives of the forestry service that had a substantial grassroots
development component. With this external ally, the private sector gained support within the
government and the congress to substantially modify the bill. Without it timber interests would
have failed completely in their effort. The weakness of the timber industrialists, however, forced
them into an alliance with small scale producers. As a result, legislation still incorporated some
grassroots development elements. By the same token, trade treaties, in particular with the United
States, largely accounted for the reversal of policy in Mexico. Although the Mexican state's semiauthoritarian character gives policy makers leeway, as a general rule they still have to balance sociopolitical interests. In this sense, the weakness of both business and peasant groups in the forestry
sector contributed to their inability to form alliances with other sectors to soften the negative
impacts of the bill. The fact that peasants in the traditional basic grains sector and industrialists in
other areas secured some relief underscored the political significance of the marginality of the forest
sector.
In conclusion, this paper has focused on when and how external factors, ideas, state
in,stitutions, and social groups affect the degree to which forest policy takes a market-friendly cast,
or whether it also includes grassroots development oriented elements; and the degree of
politicization over the issue. To begin with, throught Latin America, international agencies have
acted as background factors because their con~ern over environmental issues has helped to place
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them on the policy agenda of Latin American governments. Beyond that, however, these four cases
show that the domestic policy responses to that diffuse pressure was, in the first instance, rooted in
the ideas of policy makers within the lead ministries. However, the degree to which that policy
impetus translated into policy outcomes depended on other factors. When external factors
exclusively functioned as background variables, dome~tic conditions were more important-specifically, the economic strength or weakness of the timber industry. That dictated its capacity, to
form larger socio-political alliances in defense against grassroots development oriented policy
proposals. By the same token, the cases demonstrated that, when present, more direct external
intervention by U.S. agencies or in the form of trade treaties can alter the balance of domestic ·
forces. If grassroots development efforts confront weak timber interests, external intervention can
force compromises that otherwise would not have been on the table. When policy makers favor
market-friendly solutions, external factors can strengthen their position even further by rendering
opposition incapable of response.
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